In response to the recession of [2007][2008][2009] 
I. Introduction
Compared with other advanced industrial countries, the United States is among the least generous with respect to the duration and level of unemployment insurance (UI) benefi ts (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007) . Under normal economic circumstances, UI benefi ts in the United States are available for up to six months following job loss compared with availability of a year or longer in many European countries. In response to the severe labor market down-turn associated with "The Great Recession" of [2007] [2008] [2009] , however, UI benefi t availability was successively extended in the United States, reaching a maximum duration of 99 weeks as of late 2009 and continuing into 2012. This unprecedented expansion of UI availability has been the subject of intense policy debate that has largely revolved around the incentive effects of UI payments on job search and prolonged labor force attachment. In this paper, we provide an empirical assessment of the impact of extended UI on exit rates from unemployment and duration of unemployment in the United States. We focus in particular on a comparison between the effects of the recent UI extensions and those triggered by the earlier, less severe labor market downturn in the early 2000s.
Past empirical research has produced a range of estimates regarding the disincentive effects of UI benefi ts on job search in the United States (for example, Moffi tt 1985, Katz and Meyer 1990, Card and Levine 2000) . However, as noted by Katz (2010) , the impact of UI benefi ts on job search likely was higher in the 1970s and 1980s than it is now due to the earlier period's greater reliance on temporary layoffs and the corresponding sensitivity of recall dates to unemployment insurance benefi ts. Moreover, recent research suggests that the disincentive effects of UI are limited by the reduced returns to job search under weak labor market conditions (for example, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2010; Kroft and Notowidigdo 2011) . It may be that such considerations loomed especially large during The Great Recession. Rothstein (2011) , who presents an analysis of the effects of the recent UI extensions that is related to ours, reports small effects of the recent UI extensions on unemployment exits, duration, and the overall unemployment rate.
Because extended UI benefi ts were much more widely available during the Great Recession than during earlier periods and because of the severity of the recent labor market downturn, earlier empirical results cannot be reliably extrapolated to assess UI disincentive effects in the recent episode. We estimate these effects by developing a framework that relies on current labor market data and detailed information on the recent UI expansions. We use microdata at the individual level from the monthly survey of households and individuals that is used to construct offi cial unemployment and labor force statistics in the United States (the Current Population Survey, or CPS). We match observations on individuals across consecutive months of the data, which enables us to analyze transitions out of unemployment (exits), distinguishing between new job fi nding and labor force withdrawal. To assess the impact of UI extensions, we have compiled a detailed database of trigger dates and maximum available UI weeks at the state level. The extension of UI availability proceeded gradually, and its extent and timing varied across states. Qualifi cation for multiple UI extensions at the state level occurred based on the level and change in state unemployment rates and UI recipiency rates.
Exploiting the different timing and degree of the extensions across states, we estimate their effects on unemployment exit rates and duration. Identifi cation of the UI effects is based on individual variation in benefi t availability, conditional on state economic conditions and individual characteristics. We use both a single-risk framework based on overall exits from unemployment and a competing-risks framework that distinguishes between exits to employment and exits out of the labor force (the cessation of search activity). Distinguishing these separate exit routes is important because the effi ciency implications of extended benefi ts differ depending on whether these benefi ts delay job fi nding or simply cause labeling of those not employed as unemployed rather than not participating in the labor force.
Our analysis is related to that of Rothstein (2011) , who found small effects of the recent UI extensions on unemployment exits (mainly transitions out of the labor force), duration, and the overall unemployment rate. However, our analysis differs from and extends his in a number of ways.
• We identify the effects of UI through variation in individuals' time to exhaustion, which varies across individuals in the same state and over time as a function of total weeks of UI available in a state and individuals' duration of unemployment.
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• We expand the period of analysis by comparing the impact of this recent episode of UI extensions with the earlier episode that followed the relatively mild 2001 recession. If the effects of UI extensions on job search differ substantially depending on aggregate labor market conditions, as suggested by recent work (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2010; Kroft and Notowidigdo 2011) , the impact in the most recent recession alone may not provide a good guide for future policy.
• We extend the period of analysis through 2012 rather than stopping in early 2011. Our analysis therefore incorporates a period during which the labor market was slowly recovering from the Great Recession and extended benefi ts were being phased out on a state-by-state basis through legislative changes and state-specifi c improvements in labor market conditions. Given the possibility of delayed behavioral responses to legislation that may have been regarded as temporary by job searchers, this expanded sample period enables us to estimate a more complete behavioral response to benefi t expansions, and the rollback of extended UI has the potential to provide additional identifying information.
• We reconcile the expected duration of completed spells of unemployment derived from our fl ow-based sample of ongoing unemployment spells (from the matched monthly CPS data) with the cross-sectional distribution of unemployment durations of spells in progress obtained from the monthly CPS. This enables us to provide precise quantitative estimates of the contribution of extended UI to observed long-term unemployment, for which we fi nd relatively large effects.
To preview our results, we estimate small but statistically signifi cant reductions in the unemployment exit rate arising from both sets of unemployment extensions. The magnitudes of these effects for a given extension of UI availability (such as one month) are similar across the two episodes of UI extensions. These estimates imply a small increase in the expected duration of completed unemployment spells. Although the implied increase in expected duration is larger in the later (Great Recession) episode of UI extensions, this difference in magnitudes is due entirely to the fact that extended unemployment benefi ts were more widespread and more generous in the Great Reces-1. While Rothstein presents some estimates that rely on a similar identifi cation scheme, his primary estimates rely on variation across states and over time in total weeks of UI available. See also Marinescu (2014) for a related analysis using online job search data.
sion period. Our competing risks analysis reveals that the effects of extended benefi ts on exit from unemployment occur primarily through a reduction in labor force exits rather than a reduction in job fi nding, with a particularly pronounced effect on labor force attachment in the recent episode. Interestingly, despite the relatively small effect of extended benefi ts on the expected duration of completed spells, our estimates imply a substantial effect of extended benefi ts on the steady-state share of unemployment in the cross-section that is long-term.
II. UI Program Characteristics and Research

A. Normal and Extended Benefi ts
UI benefi ts are normally available for 26 weeks in the United States under the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation program established under the Social Security Act of 1935. Unemployed individuals are eligible to receive benefi ts if they lost a job through no fault of their own (typically a permanent or temporary layoff) and they meet state-specifi c minimum requirements regarding work history and wages during the 12-to 15-month period preceding job loss. Availability for work and active job search typically are required for ongoing receipt of UI benefi ts, although the exact rules vary across states. In most states, UI benefi ts equal about half of the claimant's preseparation weekly wage, up to a maximum that varies substantially across states. Normal UI benefi ts periodically are supplemented and extended during episodes of economic distress through a combination of permanent and temporary legislation.
2 The federal Extended Benefi ts (EB) program, permanently authorized beginning in 1970, provides up to 20 weeks of additional unemployment compensation for unemployed individuals who lost jobs in states where the level and change in the state unemployment rate is above a specifi ed threshold. The thresholds or triggers are state-specifi c but most commonly are based on an overall unemployment rate of 6.5 percent (for a 13-week extension) or 8.0 percent (for 20 weeks) combined with a 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate over the previous two years. The EB program has been supplemented by temporary programs that have been used eight times since 1958, with the most recent episode beginning in 2008. We focus on the two episodes of UI extensions since 2002. The severity of job loss and persistent labor market weakness during and after the recession of 2007-2009 resulted in an unprecedented expansion of UI benefi t availability and takeup. Between mid-2008 and late 2009, a set of expansions raised the availability of UI benefi ts up to a maximum of 99 weeks in many states. A similar but much more limited extension of UI benefi ts occurred through the Temporary Extension of Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) legislation that was effective from March 2002 through early 2004. A maximum of 72 weeks of total benefi ts were phased in during this period. We describe the timing of both sets of expansions in detail in the appendix.
As suggested by this discussion and the detailed description in the appendix of the TEUC (2002) (2003) (2004) and EUC (2008-forward) programs, the timing of the extended UI triggers and consequent maximum duration of UI eligibility varied substantially across states and over time. Different states surpassed the trigger levels for EB and TEUC / EUC availability at different times; some states never achieved the unemployment rates necessary for the complete extensions; and states saw available weeks rolled back as labor market conditions improved in 2011-12 and also as a result of the legislated rollback of maximum weeks available through the EUC program in late 2012. Figure 1 illustrates the variation in eligibility for extended UI over time (years 2000-2012) based on the various programs in effect. Panel A displays the maximum and minimum number of total UI weeks available across states, and Panel B displays the average and standard deviation of the distribution of total weeks of UI available across unemployed individuals (measured using a sample of all individuals identifi ed as unemployed and eligible to receive UI in the CPS microdata; see our defi nition of eligibility below). The spread between the maximum and minimum number of weeks was similar between the most recent episode and the preceding episode in the early 2000s at about 26 to 27 weeks. However, the number of states at or near the minimum in the recent episode, and their size, was much smaller than in the preceding episode. This is refl ected in Panel B, which shows that the average weeks of total UI eligibility reached about 96 in late 2009, implying that the typical unemployed individual was located in a state in which maximum UI eligibility was 99 weeks. In the early 2000s, maximum weeks of eligibility reached 72, but few states triggered on to the maximum extensions and only about 13 additional weeks of UI beyond the normal 26 were available to the typical unemployed individual. The standard deviation displayed in Panel B (on a separate scale, on the right side of the graph) indicates that the dispersion in total weeks available was only slightly higher in the recent episode than in the preceding one, implying that there is a similar degree of cross-state variation used for our estimates in both episodes. Panel B shows a sharp drop in 2012 in the average number of weeks of UI for which unemployed individuals qualify, as implied by the discusion of the legislation in the appendix. Figure 2 displays the pattern of UI recipiency over our sample frame based on publicly available administrative data on total UI claims. This fi gure illustrates the large expansion of UI receipt during the recent recession and subsequent reduction as the labor market recovery proceeded. The weekly fl ow of new UI claims peaked at about 660,000 in early 2009 (slightly below the peak of nearly 700,000 reached in late 1982; not shown). As of early 2013, new UI claims had declined to nearly their prerecession level. In addition to the weekly fl ow of new UI claims, two series for the level of ongoing UI claims are displayed in Figure 2: (1) regular UI claims (26 or fewer weeks), and (2) regular UI claims plus UI claims available through extensions. After peaking in late 2009 and early 2010, the level of both series had declined by about half as of early 2013. The sharp, temporary drop in mid-2010 corresponds to the suspension period of June-July 2010 (discussed in the appendix). A much smaller but still substantial number of extended benefi t claimants also is evident during the earlier episode of UI extensions from 2002-2004.
B. Past Research on UI Disincentive Effects
Standard search models of unemployment imply that UI payments are likely to reduce job fi nding and prolong unemployment spells for eligible individuals, and a voluminous empirical literature exists that attempts to quantify such effects. Much of this research has focused on unemployment exit rates around the time of UI benefi t 
Figure 1 Variation in Total Weeks of UI Available
Notes: Panel B series calculated using monthly CPS observations (weighted) for UI-eligible unemployed individuals (see Section IVA).
exhaustion, often using administrative data on UI recipients (Moffi tt 1985, Katz and Meyer 1990 , Meyer 1990 , Card and Levine 2000 , Jurajda and Tannery 2003 . The fi ndings from this research generally reveal the expected disincentive effects of UI availability on unemployment exits. Some analysts have relied on such estimates to simulate the likely effects of extended UI on unemployment durations and the unemployment rate during the recent downturn (Fujita 2010a , Mazumder 2011 . However, the estimated magnitude of such effects has varied widely across different studies. Recent research suggests that the disincentive effects of extended UI are likely to be muted relative to the effect implied by earlier research based on the exhaustion of regular UI benefi ts. This may be due to the decreased reliance on temporary layoffs over the past few decades and the unusually weak labor market conditions prevailing during the recent extension episode (Katz 2010; Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2010; Kroft and Notowidigdo 2011) . Given these concerns about relying on past research fi ndings to assess disincentive effects of extended UI in the recent episode, some researchers have relied on concurrent labor market data to directly assess the impact of extended UI. These analyses have focused on comparing unemployment durations for unemployed individuals distinguished by their likely eligibility for UI (Valletta and Kuang 2010) and examining changes in transition rates out of unemployment measured across duration spans that are distinguished by their exposure to extended UI (Fujita 2010b, Howell and Azizoglu 2011) . Such studies provide broad empirical guidance about the likely impacts of extended UI. However, they are not based on formal statistical analyses that attempt to isolate the direct effects of UI extensions while controlling for the effects of labor market conditions and individual characteristics that are related to extended UI eligibility and receipt. As such, it is diffi cult to conclude that the relationships between extended UI and exit from unemployment found in these papers are causal. We build on the existing literature by directly exploiting variation in the duration of extended UI available in different months in different states. In addition, our matched CPS data enable us to incorporate detailed controls for state economic conditions and individual characteristics into the analyses.
III. Econometric Framework and Identifi cation
The rotation group structure of the CPS allows us to follow individuals for four consecutive months if they have not changed residence. Respondents are asked their labor force state (employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force, or NILF) in each month, and the unemployed are asked how long they have been unemployed. 4 In this way, spells are "joined in progress," leading to the classic problem of length-biased sampling. This produces a sample of longer spells than the overall distribution of unemployment spells, and our econometric model needs to account for this. 5 We use a simple discrete-time hazard specifi cation to model the probability that an unemployment spell ends at duration S given that it has lasted at least until S. This hazard function is h(S), where h(•) is a probability function (such as probit or logit) that will also depend on a set of individual and labor market characteristics as well as the duration of unemployment. Assuming independence across months, the unconditional probability that a spell of unemployment ends at duration S (to either employment or NILF) is
In the case where a spell remains in progress with duration S at the last survey in which it is observed, what is known is that the duration of the spell is at least S. The unconditional probability that a spell of unemployment has duration at least S (the survivor function) is
The short-panel structure of the CPS implies that only unemployment spells lasting long enough to make it to the survey date are measured. Let S 0 represent the duration of an unemployment spell when it is fi rst observed in the CPS. Now suppose there are n observations subsequent to the fi rst observation of the unemployment 4. The CPS documentation implies that the unemployed are asked their duration only in the fi rst month they report being unemployed and that this duration is automatically incremented in subsequent months for which they report being unemployed. In fact, the sequences of spell durations are not this clean. In addition, as reported by Elsby, Hobijn, Sahin, and Valletta (2011) , in the matched CPS data many individuals identifi ed as newly unemployed in a month report durations of unemployment that substantially exceed one month. 5. The durations-to-date of the spells in progress in a cross-section is a misleading guide to the duration of a randomly selected set of completed spells. In Section VIC, we use our estimates of the model of exit from unemployment to simulate the effect of extended benefi ts on the steady-state distribution of duration of spells in progress in a cross-section. spell where the individual remains unemployed or is fi rst observed to have exited unemployment (either to employment or NILF). Given that spells are not observed unless they reach duration S 0 , the appropriate conditional probability of a spell ending with duration S is
Analogously, the appropriate conditional probability for a spell that remains in progress with duration S when it is last observed is
These conditional probabilities appropriately account for the length-biased sampling problem and allow inference about the overall distribution of unemployment durations.
The likelihood function appropriate to this model is derived from Equations 3 and 4. Assuming a standard normal CDF for the hazard probability, the result is a probit model where each monthly observation on an unemployment spell (matched to the succeeding month) contributes to the likelihood function. Monthly observations where the spell has ended by the next month have a "one" outcome with the probability specifi ed in Equation 3; each spell has at most one observation with a "one" outcome (the end of the spell). Monthly observations where the spell has not ended by the next month have a "zero" outcome with the probability specifi ed in Equation 4. The component of the likelihood function in Equation 4 accounts for right-censored spells, which are included in the analysis. This is important given the extensive censoring of unemployment spells in short panels based on matched CPS data (see the discussion of sample characteristics in Section IVB).
A specifi cation choice must be made regarding how to characterize the availability of extended benefi ts in the model. Based on past research fi ndings regarding exhaustion spikes and our preliminary specifi cation search, the approach we selected includes two indicator variables for the availability of unemployment insurance benefi ts to the worker.
1. EB it -An indicator for availability of extended benefi ts at time t that equals one if (a) individual i has been unemployed for more months than normal UI availability but fewer than the total number of UI months available (including extended benefi ts) in the relevant state and month, and (b) some extended benefi ts are available in the relevant state and month. 2. Last it -An indicator that equals one if individual i is in the last month of his / her eligibility for extended UI at time t. This is meant to allow for a spike in the exit hazard at exhaustion.
The probit model is specifi ed by assuming a spell ends in a given month if an unobserved latent variable for spell i in month t (y it ) is positive. This latent variable is
where X it is a vector of individual and economic variables, β is a vector of parameters, δ 1 is a parameter measuring the marginal effect of extended benefi ts on the hazard of an unemployment spell ending, δ 2 is a parameter measuring the marginal effect on the hazard of being in the last month of UI eligibility, and ε it is an error term with a standard normal distribution. The hazard of a spell ending is then:
where Φ(•) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The estimated model includes in the X vector a set of standard personal characteristics that are systematically related to labor market outcomes: four education categories, fi ve age categories (covering the included ages 20-64), and indicators for female, married, female*married, and nonwhite individuals. In order to account for local labor market conditions, the model includes a cubic in the monthly seasonally adjusted state unemployment rate and a cubic in the three-month annualized growth rate of seasonally adjusted log nonfarm payroll employment. To allow for a fl exible baseline hazard and to account for the effects of normal UI benefi ts, the model also includes a set of indicators for the fi rst six months of unemployment (0-6) and single indicators for months 7-9, months 10-12, and months 13-28 (nine categories in total). We also include a complete set of date (year-month) and state indicators, which provide additional controls for relative economic conditions that are shared across all states but vary over time and relative economic conditions that are state-specifi c and fi xed over time.
A. A Competing Risk Model
We apply the probit model developed here to estimate the probability that an individual exits unemployment regardless of the subsequent labor force state. It is also interesting to explore how extended benefi ts affect both the probability of exiting unemployment to a job (employment) and the probability of exiting unemployment to leave the labor force (cease searching). A competing risk framework is natural for this purpose and can be implemented as a straightforward generalization of the discrete choice hazard model outlined above. The key is to defi ne cause-specifi c hazard functions and use them in the same likelihood context.
In the competing risk framework, there are two durations associated with each spell of unemployment:
1. Time until exit to employment. Call this time the UE duration. 2. Time until exit to NILF. Call this time the UN duration.
There are three types of spells in the data.
1. Spells that end in employment. For these spells, we observe the end of a UE spell. The UN spell is censored at the duration of the UE spell. 2. Spells that end in exit to NILF. For these spells, we observe the end of a UN spell. The UE spell is censored at the duration of the UN spell.
3. Spells that do not end during the observation period. For these spells, both the UE and UN durations are censored at the last observed unemployment duration.
We estimate three versions of the unemployment exit model: (1) exit to either employment or NILF, (2) exit to employment, and (3) exit to NILF in order to determine the effect of extended benefi ts on each of these exit rates.
B. Identifying the Effects of Extended Benefi ts
Our hazard model of the exit from unemployment includes fi xed effects for each state and each month along with individual duration, demographic characteristics, and measures of local economic conditions. The effects of extended UI are identifi ed by exploiting differences in UI availability at the individual level, which are determined by the comparison of individual unemployment duration with the number of weeks of UI available in that individual's state at the same point in time (measured at a monthly frequency). These effects are estimated conditional on individual characteristics and differences in local labor market conditions. Given that UI extensions and rollbacks are triggered by deterioration or improvement in state labor market conditions, including the measures of local economic conditions in the model is crucial for this identifi cation scheme.
Consider this specifi c example of identifying information. Between April and May of 2012, maximum available weeks of UI benefi ts fell from 99 weeks to 73 weeks in Washington State and from 99 weeks to 89 weeks in Oregon. This was due to legislative changes and idiosyncratic features of prior and contemporaneous labor market conditions in those states. During this time, the actual unemployment rates were stable at 8.4 percent in Washington State and 8.8 percent in Oregon. Consider two individuals, one in each of these states, who had been unemployed for 78 weeks (18 months) as of April 2012 and who were observationally equivalent more generally. In our model, both individuals have UI available to them in April 2012 because their unemployment duration is less than their maximum eligiblity in that month. If they remain unemployed in the subsequent month, however, their unemployment duration will reach 82-83 weeks. At that time, the individual in Oregon will still have UI available, while the individual in Washington State will not. Our model will uncover an increase in unemployment duration due to extended UI if the individual in Washington State is more likely to exit unemployment between April and May of 2012 than is the individual in Oregon (conditional on their observational equivalence and unrestricted state and time effects). In this specifi c example, the difference in unemployment rates between the two states is small, and its impact on job prospects and search behavior for the two individuals is captured in our model by the local labor market controls (polynomials in the state unemployment rate and rate of payroll job growth).
It is important to note that, because our empirical models include indicator variables for each of the fi rst six months of unemployment, the EB availability indicator captures the effects of extended benefi ts only for individuals unemployed for at least six months. In other words, the specifi cation excludes any potential effects of EB availability on search behavior for the short-term unemployed. Our specifi cation was chosen to capture the rapid decline in unemployment exit rates during the fi rst six months of unemployment and to avoid the estimation biases that might result from a parametric specifi cation of duration dependence. The resulting restriction is innocuous: Rothstein (2011) found that the recent episode of extended benefi ts had meaningful effects on exit rates only for individuals unemployed for at least six months. More generally, our specifi cation enables separate estimation of the effects of UI remaining and unemployment duration at the individual level.
IV. Sample Defi nition and Data Issues
We use CPS data from January 2000 
A. Defi ning the Relevant Sample: UI Eligibility
The most appropriate sample for analysis of the effect of UI benefi ts is unemployed individuals who are eligible to receive UI. However, there is no direct information in the CPS on UI eligibility, hence we rely on a proxy measure based on the reported reason for unemployment.
Unemployed individuals who report having lost a job as the reason for unemployment are, in principle, eligible to receive UI. In contrast, individuals are, in principle, not eligible to receive UI if they report voluntarily leaving a job, new entry, or reentry into the labor force as the reason for unemployment. Although losing a job is a necessary condition for being eligible to receive UI benefi ts, it is not suffi cient. For example, a worker who reports a job loss may not have suffi cient previous employment experience to qualify for unemployment insurance or may have been fi red for cause.
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Because we do not have the detailed work-history information needed to impute eligibility, we proceed by classifying unemployed job losers as the UI-eligible group that we use in our analysis. Job leavers and new labor force entrants are classifi ed as UI-ineligible and are not included in our analysis. Later, we present a "placebo" analysis of the effect of extended benefi ts on exit from unemployment for the UI-ineligible sample (job leavers and new entrants to the labor force). We expect the effects of extended UI for this group to be smaller than for UI-eligible individuals. However, after conditioning on the other variables in our model, there may still be variation in economic conditions across states and over time that is correlated with the availability of extended benefi ts. If so, this omitted variable problem could cause us to falsely at-7. For both periods, the sample includes one to two years of data prior to the activation of the extended benefi t programs, which serve as a baseline for assessing the effects of extended benefi ts. The sample for the earlier period is terminated in early 2005 to avoid extending well beyond the end of the TEUC program in early 2004 and also to avoid inclusion of the periods in 2005 when the EB program triggered on in Alaska and Louisiana. 8. Another consideration is that an eligible worker may choose not to take up benefi ts. However, the decision to take up benefi ts may be affected by the structure of the UI program, including the availability of extended benefi ts, so it would be inappropriate to restrict the analysis to eligible workers who choose to take up benefi ts. And since we have no data in the monthly CPS that would allow us to determine actual UI receipt, we cannot make this sample distinction in any case. See Blank and Card (1991) and Anderson and Meyer (1997) for earlier studies of incomplete takeup of unemployment insurance.
tribute an effect of extended UI on unemployment exits for the ineligible group. Such a fi nding would imply that our estimates of the effect of extended UI on the UI-eligible group may be too large and would represent an upper bound on the true effect. Working in the opposite direction, there may be spillover effects on job search and job fi nding from eligible to ineligible individuals that would show up as a positive relationship between extended UI and exit from unemployment for the UI-ineligible group.
9 Table 1 provides supporting evidence for our working defi nition of UI eligibility. Each March, the regular monthly CPS is accompanied by an extensive set of supplemental questions regarding income receipt in the prior calendar year; UI is separately identifi ed as an individual income source. The rotating sample structure of the CPS enables matching of observations on unemployed individuals for selected months in year t with the information on their income receipt in year t recorded in the year t + 1 March supplement. Based on this match, Table 1 provides a breakdown of UI income receipt (percent reporting positive UI income) by measured eligibility status for individuals who are unemployed in March or December of the calendar year corresponding to reported income receipt for income years 2005-2011. The percentage of the UI-eligible who report receiving UI income reached about 50 percent in 2009 and declined somewhat in 2010-11. The percentage of the UI-ineligible who report receiving UI income is much lower, usually at about 5-10 percent, with a few higher values recorded. Because individuals may be subject to multiple unemployment spells over a calendar year, an unknown proportion of individuals identifi ed as ineligible in a particular month may have received UI income based on a separate spell of unemployment that year for which they were eligible for UI receipt based on their stated reason for unemployment. On balance, we interpret these fi gures as suggesting that our eligibility indicator is strongly correlated with actual eligibility status, although takeup of unemployment insurance by those eligible is clearly not universal.
B. Sample Construction: Matching the Monthly CPS
Given its rotation group structure, the CPS interviews a given address (housing unit) for four consecutive months, does not interview for eight months, and reinterviews the address for four more months. In other words, over a 16-month period, the household is surveyed for four months, left alone for eight months, and surveyed for four more months. This sample structure allows us to match households in consecutive months up to three times. Failures to match primarily occur when a household moves to a new housing unit between interviews. This generally occurs less than 5 percent of the time.
One key concern with regard to use of the matched data is the likelihood of spurious transitions in labor force status, particularly spurious exits from unemployment, that can lead to an overestimate of the probability of exit from unemployment (Abowd and Zellner 1985 , Poterba and Summers 1986 , 1995 . As demonstrated by Rothstein (2011) , the unemployment durations implied by the frequency and duration structure of exits from unemployment are much lower than the reported durations of spells in 9. The empirical results in Levine (1993) and in Lalive, Landais, and Zweimuller (2013) suggest that the UI-induced reduction in job fi nding within the group of UI eligibles increases job availability and hence the job-fi nding rate for ineligibles. progress in the cross-section. 10 This difference in distributions is due in part to the length-biased sampling inherent in an analysis of durations of spells in progress in a cross-section. But the difference is also the result of the likely presence of spurious transitions. These spurious transitions are potentially problematic for the estimation of our models because errors in the identifi cation of exit from unemployment could bias seriously the estimates of the effects of extended benefi ts.
Following Rothstein (2011), we address this problem through direct adjustments to reported transitions following specifi c patterns that are indicative of misclassifi cation. In particular, for individuals who report a transition out of unemployment in month one followed immediately by an entry back to unemployment in month three, we recode the intervening month as a continuation of the initial unemployment spell. We do this whether the unemployment exit is due to job fi nding or labor force withdrawal. In other words, letting U represent unemployment, E employment, and N out of the labor force, we recode three-month transition patterns of UEU and UNU to UUU, and we retain both of the resulting UU "transitions" in the matched data. We recoded 3,016 UEU transitions and 7,119 UNU transitions (a total of 10,135 transitions) in our estimation samples in this way.
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Some support for the idea that UEU and UNU transitions are likely to be spurious is that reported unemployment durations in the third month of observed UEU and UNU transitions is, on average, far greater than one month (average of 5.7 months, median of three months). As noted by Elsby et al. (2011) , it is likely that individuals' reported 10. We confi rmed that this is not due to the construction of the matched CPS sample. The distribution of reported durations from the sample, treated as a series of cross-sections, is essentially identical to the distribution from the complete CPS cross-sections. 11. Of these 10,135 recoded transitions, 5,008 were for UI-eligible spells and 5,127 were for UI-ineligible spells. unemployment duration refl ects the time elapsed since the loss of a salient job, which is likely the one that enabled them to qualify for UI benefi ts. The reported durations are therefore much more likely to capture the duration of a spell of ongoing UI receipt than are the durations implied by reported unemployment exits, which may refl ect stopgap jobs and temporary labor force withdrawals in addition to direct reporting errors (see also Poterba and Summers 1995) . Figure 3 contains a plot of average (over the 2000-2012 period) exit rates from unemployment by duration of unemployment. Two exit rates are presented: (1) the observed exit rate and (2) the exit rate adjusted by recoding UNU and UEU sequences to UUU (no exit). The adjustment substantially reduces the exit rates from unemployment, implying an increase in the survivor function and associated unemployment durations.
12
Imposing this adjustment to observed transitions requires restricting the set of observations we use to the fi rst two of each set of four consecutive CPS rotation groups so that we have at least two subsequent matched observations. We impose this restriction and the transition adjustment for all of our analysis samples. As such, although we use CPS data through December 2012, our fi nal observation is for October 2012. In addition, to ensure valid matches of individuals across months, we dropped a small number of observations for which reported age, gender, race, and educational attainment are not consistent across months (for example, age changes by more than one year). We limit our sample to individuals ages 20-64. Table 2 contains, for each period and by eligibility status, counts of the number of spells that end with employment, end with NILF, and are right censored. When considering the competing risk model, (1) the number of censored UE spells is the sum of the number of spells that end in NILF and the number that do not end within the observation period and (2) the number of censored UN spells is the sum of the number of spells that end in employment and the number that do not end within the observation period.
Our matched CPS sample covering January 2000 through February 2005 contains 75,089 monthly observations on 54,678 spells of unemployment for workers ages 20-64. The analogous sample for January 2007 through October 2012 contains 126,062 monthly observations on 86,869 spells of unemployment. In order to examine the representativeness of our matched sample, we compared the reported unemployment duration in our sample, based on the survey responses regarding in-progress spells, with published statistics on unemployment duration from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Figure 4 contains plots of three statistics from the two distributions of unemployment durations. These are mean duration, median duration, and the fraction of long-term unemployed (at least six months). While the BLS series is seasonally adjusted and our series is not, it is clear that there is little difference between our sample of unemployment durations from the matched CPS and the BLS reported statistics from all sampled unemployment spells in the CPS. The notable exception is average duration, for which the reported BLS series has systematically higher values than our series late in the sample frame. This pattern arises due to the increase in the survey top-code value of unemployment duration beginning in early 2011, which applies to the data fi les used to compute the BLS series but not the public use microdatafi les. The unemployment durations in Figure 4 come from the cross-sectional distribution of spells in progress. As noted earlier, due to the length-biased sampling problem, this 13 . See the BLS data note at http: // www.bls.gov / cps / duration.htm. distribution is likely to overstate the duration distribution for all spells of unemployment. This is implied by the tabulations of survivor rates of unemployment spells in Table 3 , for which we used our matched data to calculate survivor rates across months during the fi rst year of unemployment. This table displays the tabulations separately for our two estimation samples (January 2000 -February 2005 in Column 1 and Janu-ary 2007-October 2012 in Column 3). In order to highlight the higher unemployment survivor rates in the weakest labor market periods, the table also displays survivor rates for the subperiods with relatively high availability of extended benefi ts and unemployment rates (March 2002 -February 2004 in Column 2 for the earlier period and January 2009-December 2011 in Column 4 for the later period). The exit rates from unemployment are suffi ciently high that only a small fraction of individuals remain unemployed after the fi rst six months. In the weak labor market from 2002-2004, only about 10 percent of unemployment spells for job losers (our UI-eligible sample) lasted past six months. In the very weak labor market from [2009] [2010] [2011] 13 .7 percent of job losers remained unemployed for at least six months. On inspection, it appears that the survivor rates presented in Table 2 are not consistent with the cross-section distribution of durations of incomplete spells calculated directly from the CPS. For example, in the 2009-2011 period, the survival rate at six months is 13.7 percent while 39.8 percent of spells in progress in the cross-section in this period were at least six months. This is largely a result of the length-biased sampling built into the cross-section that results in oversampling of long spells. In Section VIC, we present estimates of the steady-state cross-section distribution of spells in progress implied by our model of exits that reconciles much of this difference. Our analysis highlights the inappropriateness of making inferences about the distribution of completed spells from the cross-section distribution of spells in progress. Figure 5 complements Table 3 by showing monthly exit rates from unemployment over our complete sample tabulated for all exits in Panel A and exits by type (to employment or out of the labor force) in Panels B and C. In each case, we display the exit rates for all unemployed individuals and also for UI-eligible and ineligible individuals separately. A sharp decline in exit rates, particularly exits to employment, is evident during the recent recession, with a minor rebound evident beginning in 2010. Overall exit rates are higher for UI-ineligible individuals than for eligible individuals, which refl ects the large gap between the two groups for exits out of the labor force (Panel C). The rates of labor force exit from unemployment exhibit very little cyclicality, with only a slight net decline evident during the recent recession and essentially no cyclicality evident for UI ineligibles. 
V. Estimation of the Probit Model of Exit
We present estimates of the probit model, specifi ed in Equations 5 and 6, of the probability that an unemployment spell ends in a given month. The key parameters we estimate representing the effect of extended benefi ts on the unemployment exit probability are ␦ 1 (the coeffi cient on the EB indicator) and ␦ 2 (the coeffi cient on the Last indicator for the fi nal month of extended UI eligibility). As specifi ed in Equation 5, the underlying estimated probit parameter on EB is ␦ 1 , and the average marginal effect of EB on the probability of exit from unemployment is computed from this as
where ϕ(•) is the standard normal probability density function and N is the sample size. Analogously, the average marginal effect of exhaustion of UI (indicated by Last) on the probability of exit is
Note that both of these marginal effects could be important in measuring the effect of extended benefi ts because extended benefi ts increase the number of periods for which an individual can receive UI and any spike in the exit probability at exhaustion is pushed further into the unemployment spell when extended benefi ts are available.
Estimates of the key parameters from six versions of the probit model of exit from unemployment are presented in Table 4 . There are three models for each of the two time periods (January 2000-February 2005 and January 2007-October 2012) with a period of extended benefi ts. Within each time period, there is a model of exit from unemployment and two models representing the competing risks of exit to employment and exit to NILF. There is a clear pattern to the estimates. In both time periods and in the single risk and in the competing risk model for exit from the labor force, the availability of extended benefi ts has a substantial and precisely estimated negative effect on the probability of exit from unemployment (indicated by ␦ 1 * ). These effects are comparable across the two time periods, and they are primarily driven by the effects of extended benefi ts on labor force exits. The effect of extended benefi ts on the probability of exit to employment (the job-fi nding rate) is much smaller and less precisely estimated than is the effect on labor force exits, although the job-fi nding effect is marginally signifi cant for the earlier sample period (p-value of about 0.08). This suggests that the negative effect of extended benefi ts on the exit rate from unemployment is driven largely by individuals remaining in the labor force longer, perhaps to qualify for UI benefi ts through active job search, rather than by individuals reducing search effort and taking longer to fi nd jobs. This pattern is largely consistent across the two time periods.
The evidence in Table 4 on the effect of exhaustion of benefi ts on exit from unemployment is mixed. This is represented by ␦ 2 * , the average marginal effect of being in the last month of UI eligibility on the probability of exit. In the earlier time period, the exit rate from unemployment and the exit to NILF are signifi cantly higher in the last month of eligibility for UI. This is another mechanism through which extended benefi ts can increase the duration of unemployment spells. The availability of extended benefi ts pushes the exhaustion spike deeper into the spell of unemployment. There is no signifi cant effect of exhaustion of benefi ts on exit to employment (the job-fi nding rate) in the earlier period. Exhaustion of benefi ts does not have a statistically significant effect on any of the exit measures in the later period.
We infer from the estimated coeffi cients in Table 4 that the main effects of extended UI are on labor force attachment rather than job fi nding. However, assessment of the complete magnitudes of these effects requires a simulation that takes the full set of estimated coeffi cients into account. We discuss those results below in Section VI. We fi rst discuss the results from a placebo test based on a sample of UI-ineligible individuals.
A. A Placebo Test: UI-Ineligible Spells
We defi ned the UI-eligible group to be those who report a job loss as their reason for unemployment. The remaining unemployed report being a job leaver (quit) or a labor force entrant (new entry or reentry) as their reason for unemployment, and we classify these individuals as UI ineligible. While this classifi cation scheme is not perfect, we presented evidence in Table 1 based on the March CPS that only a small fraction of job leavers and new entrants report having received UI. This group should be largely unaffected by the availability of extended benefi ts. On this basis, we reestimate our probit model of exit from unemployment on samples of UI-ineligible unemployed individuals in order to provide a placebo test of our estimation strategy. If we fi nd effects of extended benefi ts on exit from unemployment for the ineligible that are similar to those we present in Table 3 , it could be that we have not adequately controlled for state / month specifi c economic conditions, and hence our estimates of the effect of extended benefi ts are too large. 14 A potential factor working in the opposite direction is that there may be a positive effect of extended benefi ts on exit from unemployment among the UI ineligible resulting from spillovers from eligible to ineligible individuals. As we noted earier, the reasoning is that, if extended benefi ts reduce the job fi nding rate among the UI eligible, there may be improved job opportunities for the UI ineligible that increase their exit rate from unemployment (Levine 1993; Lalive, Landais, and Zweimuller 2013) . Table 5 contains the estimates of the key UI parameters (␦ 1 * and ␦ 2 * ) estimated for the sample of UI-ineligible spells. In the earlier period, we estimate there to be no effect of either the availability of extended benefi ts or the exhaustion of benefi ts on the exit rate in either the single risk or the competing risks model. In the later period, we do fi nd a statistically signifi cant negative effect of the availability of extended benefi ts on the unemployment exit rate in the single risk model and in the exit-to-NILF model. These estimates suggest that our estimates for the UI-eligible sample in Table 3 may be biased upward in absolute magnitude.
Interestingly, our estimates show a marginally signifi cant (though small) increase in the exit rate to employment due to extended benefi ts for the UI-ineligible individuals in the 2007-2012 period. As noted above, this may refl ect a spillover from those eligible for UI to those not eligible for UI.
Our conclusion from the placebo exercise is that in the earlier period we appear to have adequately controlled for labor market conditions while in the later period it may be the case that the availability of extended benefi ts is correlated with unmeasured (unfavorable) economic conditions. As such, our estimates of the effect of extended benefi ts on exit from unemployment in the later period could be considered an upper bound on the true effect.
VI. How Large Is the Effect of Extended Benefi ts?
In order to quantify the effect of extended benefi ts on unemployment duration, we use our estimates to calculate the distribution of duration of unemployment spells under a set of four alternative scenarios regarding the availability of extended benefi ts. We select these alternative scenarios to facilitate comparison across the two episodes of extended benefi ts we study of (1) the effects of the observed 14. An alternative view is that the availability of extended UI benefi ts will increase the equilibrium wage so that employers will post fewer vacancies (Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman 2013) . This would reduce the job fi nding rate of ineligibles as well as eligibles. extended benefi t programs and (2) the potential effects of comparably sized extended benefi t programs. The four scenarios are:
1. Observed-EB: A baseline scenario that uses the actual availability of extended benefi ts in each state in a given month. This is meant to provide a reference prediction of the survivor function and the expected duration. 2. No-EB: A scenario that assumes no extended benefi ts were available in any state in any month regardless of local labor market conditions. In comparison with the baseline, this provides a measure of the extent to which the actual program of extended benefi ts affected the distribution of duration of unemployment spells. 3. Full-EB: A scenario that assumes that 99 weeks of extended benefi ts were available in all states and months during the hypothetical spells. In comparison with the No-EB scenario, this provides a measure of the extent to which a universal unemployment insurance program offering 99 weeks of benefi ts would affect the distribution of duration of unemployment spells. Without this comparison, it would be diffi cult to compare the 2002-2004 with the 2008 and later experiences with extended benefi ts because extended benefi ts in the earlier period were much less widespread and shorter in benefi t duration. 4. One-Month-EB: A scenario that assumes one month of extended benefi ts were available in all states and months during the hypothetical spells. In comparison with the no-extended-benefi ts scenario, this provides a measure of the extent to which a marginal increase in the available duration of unemployment insurance would affect the distribution of duration of unemployment spells. This scenario provides a useful metric for comparing our results to prior estimates of the effects of extended UI benefi ts on unemployment duration.
For each scenario, we use our estimates to calculate the expected duration of unemployment spells (E(D)) and the underlying survivor function. We also use our estimates to calculate the distribution of unemployment durations that would be observed in a cross-section in a steady state and how this steady state distribution is affected by the availability of extended benefi ts.
We begin by creating a set of individuals starting unemployment spells based on the characteristics of unemployed workers over the period from January 2000 to October 2012. We create a spell for each unemployed job loser (the "eligible" group) aged 20-64. This set of 96,575 spells refl ects the wide distribution of observable characteristics among the unemployed including demographics, human capital, and state of residence. We use this set of individuals to create two hypothetical sets of unemployment spells that cover the two periods of extended benefi ts in our sample: For each of the three scenarios regarding extended benefi ts described above and based on the estimates from the relevant probit model of unemployment exit, we predict for each spell the monthly hazard of exit from unemployment for each month for the fi rst 28 months of the spell. 16 We use these predicted hazards to estimate the expected duration and the survivor function of each spell, and we present the average across spells of these quantities.
The estimated survivor function of spell i at duration t is
where ĥ i (s) is the estimated unemployment exit probability for spell i in month s. In order to compute the expected spell duration, we need to assume something specifi c about the distribution of long spells. We assume that the monthly hazard of a spell ending after month 28 is constant for each spell at the average value for that individual of the hazard from months 24-28. This implies that the distribution of time remaining in spells after month 28 is exponential and that the expected duration of spells from 15. We consider this period because labor market conditions typically lag the NBER business cycle dates. For example, the peak unemployment rate since 2007 was in the fourth quarter of 2009 while the NBER dated the end of the Great Recession in the second quarter of 2009.We also investigated hypothetical spells for two other time periods related to the Great Recession. The fi rst spanned July 2008-October 2010. Given the lag between labor market conditions and recession timing, this period is early relative to the very low unemployment exit rates characteristic of the weak labor market subsequent to the Great Recession. The second time period spanned July 2010-October 2012. Given that the maximum extended benefi ts only began to phase out late in this period, the effects of extended benefi ts on the duration distribution are virtually identical to those Table 4 ). this point is simply the inverse of the constant hazard. On this basis, the expected duration of each spell is
where h i is the average across months 24-28 of the estimated monthly hazard of unemployment spell i ending. The comparison of the Observed-EB and No-EB scenarios suggests that extended benefi ts had a more persistent effect on the duration of unemployment at higher durations (after about ten months) in the later period than in the earlier period. This is not surprising given the relatively limited duration and availability of extended benefi ts in the earlier period. Indeed, the comparison of the Full-EB and No-EB scenarios makes it clear that much of the difference across periods is due to the higher level of availability and generosity of UI in the 2009-2011 period relative to the 2002-2004 period. Interestingly, the Observed-EB -No-EB difference in survival probabilities falls sharply after about one year in the later period despite the fact that almost two years of extended benefi ts were available.
A. The Effect of Extended Benefi ts on the Survivor Function of Unemployment Durations
Taken together, Figures 6 and 7 imply that there is a measurable effect of a generous extended benefi ts program on unemployment durations for the small fraction (about 15 percent) of unemployment spells that last at least six months. Focusing on the Full-EB -No-EB comparison in the righthand columns of the two fi gures, at 12 months-duration in 2009 there is about a two percentage point higher survival probability attributable to the availability of full extended benefi ts. Given a predicted survival probability at 12 months in the 2009 Observed and Full-EB cases of about 0.06, this implies that about 1 / 3 (0.02 / 0.06) of the surviving unemployment spells at one year are due to the availability of extended benefi ts. Although this seems substantial, this effect only applies to the very small fraction of spells (about 6 percent) that survive at least one year.
B. The Effect of Extended Benefi ts on Expected Duration
A useful summary measure of the overall effect of extended benefi ts on the distribution of duration of unemployment spells is the expected (average) duration of an unemployment spell. 
Figure 7 Difference in Unemployment Survivor Functions, by EB Scenario and Time Period
the proportional difference in average expected duration between the Full-EB and No-EB scenario (thereby holding constant the extent of availability). This comparison shows a very similar effect of Full-EB on expected durations across the two periods (7 percent in both periods). At the bottom of each panel, an additional month of extended benefi ts (from the base of no extended benefi ts) increases expected duration of unemployment spells by about 0.06 months (0.25 weeks) in both periods. This translates to a 2 percent increase in expected duration in the earlier period and, given the relatively longer expected durations in the later period, a 1 percent increase in expected duration in that period. The nonlinear relationship between the duration of extended benefi ts and the expected duration of unemployment is clear from the pattern of results. Consider the earlier period. The 7 percent increase in expected duration implied by the Full-EB scenario is 3.5 times the 2 percent increase in expected duration implied by the OneMonth-EB scenario despite the fact that the Full-EB scenario incorporates a 17-fold increase in extended benefi ts. Although not as dramatic as in the earlier period, the nonlinearity in response is also substantial in the later period (a ratio of 17 to 7 rather than 17 to 3.5).
Finally, we note that the magnitude of our estimates is slightly below the bottom end of the range of estimated effects of UI extensions from past research using U.S. administrative data. The results for both periods in Panels A and B of Table 6 show that an additional month of extended benefi ts raises unemployment duration by 0.06 months. By comparison, the estimates from Katz and Meyer (1990) imply that a onemonth extension raises unemployment duration by 0.16 to 0.20 months. Estimates based on more recent data from Card and Levine (2000) and Jurajda and Tannery (2003) imply that a one-month extension raises unemployment duration by 0.07 to 0.08 months. Our estimate is slightly below the bottom end of this range, consistent with the view that the impact of extended UI benefi ts on job search have declined over time (Katz 2010) . 
Time to exit to employment and NILF: the competing risk model
There are at least two pathways through which extended benefi ts could reduce exit from unemployment:
1. The unemployed could reduce search effort or maintain a higher reservation wage. Either results in longer time until an unemployment spell ends in a new job. 2. The unemployed could remain attached to the labor force and searching (perhaps minimally) when, without extended benefi ts, they would exit the labor force.
The competing risk model is well suited to investigating the extent to which extended benefi ts works through these pathways, and the estimated effects of extended benefi ts on the times until exit to employment and exit to NILF are shown in the second and third columns of Table 6 for each scenario and in each time period.
Recall that the estimated marginal effects from the probit model do not show a signifi cant effect of extended benefi ts on exit to employment (Table 4 ). The point estimates themselves imply only a small proportional effect of extended benefi ts on the expected time until exit to employment. The estimated proportional effect of extended benefi ts on expected time until exit to employment is only 3-4 percent in each of the time periods (Column 2 of Table 6 ) even for the stark comparison of the Full-EB and No-EB scenarios. One month of extended benefi ts increases the time to exit to 18. These magnitudes are based on the results listed in the abstracts of Katz and Meyer (1990) and Card and Levine (2000) and in Footnote 35 of Jurajda and Tannery (2003) . In particular, Katz and Meyer report a 0.16 to 0.20 week increase in duration for a one-week extension, Card and Levine report a one-week increase in duration for a 13-week extension, and Jurajda and Tannery report a 1.87-week increase in duration for a 25-week extension.
employment by about one day in the earlier period and less than one day in the later period.
The estimated marginal effect of extended benefi ts on time to exit to NILF were statistically signifi cant in the probit model (Table 4) in both time periods. The effects of extended benefi ts on time to exit to NILF are substantial in each of our sets of hypothetical spells of unemployment (Column 3 of Table 6 ). In the set of hypothetical spells starting in March 2002, the difference between the Observed and No-EB time to exit to NILF is 0.43 months (5 percent of average expected duration in the No-EB scenario). The effect is relatively small because extended benefi ts were not widespread and were less generous in this period. The Full-EB -No-EB difference during this period is 1.02 months (12 percent of average expected duration in the No-EB scenario), refl ecting the large marginal effect of extended benefi ts in Table 3 . In the 2009-2011 time period, the difference between the Observed and No-EB time to exit to NILF is almost a full month (10 percent of observed expected time to exit). One month of extended benefi ts increases the time to exit to NILF by about three days in both periods.
These results from the competing risk model are clear-cut. We do not fi nd a substantial effect of extended benefi ts on time to exit to employment. This implies that there is not a signifi cant reduction in search effort or increase in the reservation wage due to the availability of extended benefi ts. However, we do fi nd a signifi cant effect of extended benefi ts on time to exit to NILF. This implies that there may be individuals who remain attached to the labor force, perhaps searching at a low level, because extended benefi ts are available. In our view, this latter effect of extended benefi ts does not have fi rst-order effi ciency consequences on the level of employment. It refl ects mainly a redistribution to long-term unemployed job losers who, without extended benefi ts, would have left the labor force. 
The effect of extended benefi ts on the measured unemployment rate
We now assess the direct effect of extended benefi ts on the measured unemployment rate. Our simple approach is based on two assumptions: (1) extended benefi ts have no effect on the rate of entry into unemployment or into the labor force and (2) extended benefi ts have no effect on exit from unemployment for job leavers or new entrants (our UI-ineligible sample). In this case, the proportional effect of extended benefi ts on the unemployment rate is equal to their proportional effect on the duration of unemployment spells multiplied by the fraction of spells that are UI eligible. 20 On this basis, extended benefi ts accounted for (1) 0.12 percentage points (2.2 percent) of the 5.4 percent unemployment rate in 2003 and (2) 0.40 percentage points (4.4 percent) of the 9 percent unemployment rate in 2010.
19. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) term this the "reporting effect" of unemployment insurance. 20. We use the proportional difference between the Observed-EB expected duration and the No-EB expected duration in Table 6 as our measure of the proportional effect of extended benefi ts on expected duration. In 2003, 55.6 percent of spells were UI eligible while in 2010 63.0 percent of spells were UI eligible.
C. The Cross-Section Distribution of Unemployment Duration in a Steady State
The weak labor market in the Great Recession and its aftermath is notable not only for the high level of unemployment but also for the historically high average duration of unemployment and incidence of long-term unemployment as measured based on the reported duration of in-progress spells (Figure 4) . 21 An interesting question regards the extent to which these long durations observed in the cross-section are attributable to the availability of extended benefi ts.
The effects of extended benefi ts on expected durations and on the distribution of spells more generally pertains to the distribution of completed spells. The cross-sectional distribution of durations of spells in progress results from the dynamic process of births and deaths of spells over time, and it is known to overrepresent longer spells (length-biased sampling). The result is that the survivor function for a set of spells starting at a point in time appears on its face to be inconsistent with the observed cross-sectional distribution. For example, the raw survivor rates calculated from our matched CPS data (Table 2) show that for the 2009-2011 period 13.7 percent of unemployment spells last at least six months, while the cross-sectional distribution of unemployment spells for the same period shows 39 percent of unemployment spells in progress have lasted at least six months. The same comparison for March 2002 through June 2004 shows that 9.9 percent of unemployment spells from the matched CPS last at least six months versus 22 percent in the cross-section.
We use our estimates of the model of exit from unemployment together with the steady-state assumption that there is a constant monthly infl ow into unemployment to estimate the effect of extended benefi ts on the cross-sectional distribution of duration of spells in progress. We calculate these cross-sectional distributions for each of the two time periods (March 2002 -June 2004 and January 2009 -April 2011 and for the Observed-EB and No-EB scenarios. The idea is that, in a steady state, the estimate of the survivor probability (G(•)) at a given duration S is also an estimate of the probability in a cross-section that a spell that started s periods earlier is still in progress. On this basis, the fraction of spells in progress in the cross-section with duration greater than s is
where Ĝ ( j) is the average predicted probability that a spell of unemployment that started j periods earlier is still in progress (the survivor probability in the steady state). Table 4 and the two sets of hypothetical spells of unemployment described earlier. In order to implement the steady state assumption, exit probabilities 21. Long-term unemployment is defi ned by the BLS as durations of at least 27 weeks. 22. In practice, we sum the survivor probabilities to 28 months (rather than an infi nite sum). Contributions to the sums decline sharply with duration and are trivial after about 24 months.
were predicted using the estimated parameters and assuming that the time-varying measures (the month indicators and the measures of economic activity in the state) are held constant at their state-specifi c mean values for each time period. As such, we are assuming not only that entry into unemployment is time invariant but also that economic conditions are stable as well. The fi gures include a vertical line at six months indicating the point beyond which unemployment duration is considered to be "long term."
The lefthand panel of Figure 8 contains the plot for the March 2002-April 2004 simulated sample of unemployment spells. In the Observed-EB scenario, the average duration of spells in progress is 4.22 months and 20.3 percent of spells in the cross-section are long term (≥ 6 months). In the No-EB scenario, the average duration of spells in progress is 3.95 months and 17.3 percent of spells in the cross-section are long term. 23. This compares with average duration of 6.6 months and a long-term unemployment share of 22.5 percent based on reported durations in the CPS cross-section over the same period. Our steady-state calculation cannot exactly mimic the observed cross-section distribution of unemployment durations because of the extreme assumptions of constant fl ows into unemployment and a stable economic environment. However, the steady-state calculation goes a long way to reconciling the low survivor rates for individual spells with the relatively high share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment in the cross-section. simulated samples of unemployment spells. In the Observed-EB scenario, the average duration of spells in progress is 5.74 months and 31.4 percent of spells in the cross-section are long term (≥ 6 months). 24 In the No-EB scenario, the average duration of spells in progress is 4.85 months and 24.3 percent of spells in the cross-section are long term. This implies that the availability of extended benefi ts account for 0.89 months (about 15.5 percent) of average unemployment duration in the cross-section and about 22.6 percent of long-term unemployment for UI eligibles in the 2009-2011 period.
These calculations imply that the availability of extended benefi ts had a larger impact on average unemployment duration and long-term unemployment in the 2009-2011 period (increases of 15.5 percent and 22.6 percent respectively) than in the 2002-2004 period (increases of 6.4 percent and 14.8 percent respectively). This is consistent with the fi ndings we reported earlier and as expected given the substantially higher prevalence and duration of extended benefi ts in the Great Recession and its aftermath.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We examined the impact of the unprecedented extensions of UI benefi ts in the United States in recent years on unemployment dynamics and duration and compared their effects with the extension of UI benefi ts in the milder recession of the early 2000s. We found small but statistically signifi cant reductions in unemployment exits and small increases in unemployment durations arising from both sets of UI extensions. Our estimates imply that an additional month of extended benefi ts raises unemployment duration by about 0.06 months, which is slightly below the bottom end of the range of past estimates (Katz and Meyer 1990 , Card and Levine 2000 , Jurajda and Tannery 2003 . This estimated effect of an additional month of UI benefi ts is identical across the two episodes of benefi t extensions. However, the overall impact of the UI extensions was much larger in the recent episode due to the much greater scope of the recent extensions.
We also found that the effect on exit from unemployment occurs primarily through a reduction in labor force exits rather than through reduced exit to employment (job fi nding). This is important because it implies that extended benefi ts do not delay the time to reemployment substantially and so do not have large fi rst-order effi ciency consequences. The major effect of extended benefi ts is redistributive, providing income to job losers who otherwise would have exited the labor force earlier (consistent with Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007).
While we fi nd small effects of extended benefi ts both on exits from unemployment and on the expected duration of completed unemployment spells, our estimates imply a substantial effect of extended benefi ts on the share of unemployment in the cross-section that is long term. For example, we fi nd that during the recent downturn, extended benefi ts increased the expected duration of unemployment by about 7 percent but accounted for about 23 percent of long-term unemployment in the cross-section. This apparent confl ict arises because the primary effect of extended benefi ts is on the small fraction of unemployment spells that last long enough to be considered long term (> 6 months).
Potential caveats to our fi ndings include the possibile infl uence of misclassifi cation of labor force states and consequent mismeasurement of exits from unemployment, plus the possible misclassifi cation of individuals as UI eligible. Mismeasurement of labor force states is likely to create a downward bias in our estimated effects of extended benefi ts. On the other hand, the results of our placebo analysis of UI ineligibles raises the possibility that our indicators of UI availability are correlated with unobserved features of state economic conditions, creating an upward bias in our estimated effects of extended benefi ts. These biases run in opposite directions and are likely to offset to some degree.
Our fi ndings have potentially important policy implications. Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2012) used German data and like us found small effects of benefi t extensions and limited variation in these effects across periods with different aggregate labor market conditions. They argue that the socially optimal duration of UI benefi ts varies with the inverse of the ratio between the effects of UI extensions on nonemployment duration and the duration of UI benefi t recipiency. Given our estimates of a limited impact of extended UI on job fi nding, combined with large numbers of individuals who received UI benefi ts in recent years, it is likely that optimal UI benefi t duration was quite long during the Great Recession and its aftermath. This is an important area for future research.
Overall, our estimates suggest that extending unemployment insurance benefi ts in weak labor markets has virtually no effect on the rate of job fi nding but that, on average, unemployment spells are somewhat longer as a subset of UI recipients remain nominally unemployed rather than exit the labor force. In addition to these limited implications for economic effi ciency, we fi nd only small impacts on the aggregate labor market. We estimate that extended UI increased the overall unemployment rate by only about 0.4 percentage points in the recent episode, which is small in comparison with the peak unemployment rate of 10 percent.
EUC Tiers III and IV were added in early November of 2009. At that point, Tier II eligibility was expanded by one week to 14, and the unemployment rate threshold was eliminated for Tier II eligibility and applied to Tier III eligibility (13 weeks). Tier IV eligibility (6 weeks) was based on a TUR of at least 8.5 percent or an IUR of at least 6 percent. As of November of 2009 and continuing through late 2012, individuals in states that met eligibility requirements for EB and all EUC tiers could receive up to 99 weeks of UI payments (26 weeks of regular benefi ts, 20 weeks of EB, and 53 weeks of EUC).
The maximum of 99 weeks through existing legislation continued into early September 2012. By that point, however, many states had "triggered off" (became ineligible for) available EUC tiers and EB benefi ts based on declines in their unemployment rates. 25 In addition, as of early September 2012, the number of weeks available through the various EUC tiers was reduced slightly, lowering the maximum number of UI weeks available from 99 to 93. By the end of 2012, no state qualifi ed for all EUC tiers and maximum EB benefi ts; the highest number of weeks available through all programs in any state at that point was 83. In addition, in 2011 and 2012, a small number of states (seven) reduced their normal UI availability below 26 weeks, in some cases based on formulas that depend on the existing state unemployment rate. These reductions in normal UI weeks also reduced the number of weeks of extended UI benefi ts available in those states through the formulas specifi ed in the EUC legislation. We include these features of state law in our data on available UI weeks.
It is important to note that the EUC program was subject to several temporary suspensions arising from legislative disagreements that precluded seamless reauthorization of the program. Suspensions of 12 days or longer occurred during April, JuneJuly, and December of 2010. Although otherwise eligible individuals were unable to apply for a new tier of EUC benefi ts during those months, these individuals were permitted to attain the new tier after program reinstatement and receive retroactive benefi ts. Because reinstatement was expected and individuals were allowed to receive benefi ts on their existing tiers during the suspensions, it is likely that the suspension periods did not signifi cantly offset any behavioral responses to the overall extension programs. In all of our analyses, we record UI availability during the EUC suspension months as being identical to availability in the month immediately preceding the suspension under the assumption that job search behavior was not affected by the suspensions.
A similar but much more limited extension of UI benefi ts occurred through the Temporary Extension of Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) legislation that was effective from March 2002 through early 2004. In all states, individuals who exhausted their regular state UI benefi ts were automatically eligible for an additional 13 weeks of benefi ts. Individuals in states classifi ed as "high unemployment" (based on the level and change in the insured unemploymente rate) were eligible for an additional 13 weeks of UI benefi ts. In conjunction with EB eligibility of up to 20 weeks, a maxi-25. The EB triggers also are based on a 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate over the preceding two years ("look back" provisions). This constraint became binding on a widespread basis as labor market weakness persisted. As of late 2010, the legislation was changed so that the unemployment rate three years earlier can be used. mum of 46 weeks of extended benefi ts and 72 weeks of total benefi ts were available during the period of TEUC authorization. The TEUC program was phased out in early 2004, with individuals who fi led a valid TEUC claim prior to the end of 2003 able to continue receiving those benefi ts for as long as they lasted in 2004 (up to 13 weeks, so potentially through March).
